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that, contrary to the Arrow view, an endogenous entry threat in a market 
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they increase it for an incumbent leader. These results hold after a 
number of robustness tests with instrumental variable regressions. 
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 1 Introduction
There is a lot of debate on the role of market leaders in investing in R&D and
promoting technological progress. A commonly held view is that ﬁrms invest
more in a more competitive market where the entry pressure is stronger, and
incumbents tend to be less innovative than their followers, so that the per-
sistence of their dominance is typically the signal of market power and of the
lack of entry pressure. This view is often associated with Arrow (1962), who
has shown that incumbents have lower incentives to invest in R&D than the
outsiders, and that in case of free entry in the competition for the market
they do not invest at all, leaving the innovative activity to the outsiders. In
this paper we adopt a Schumpeterian perspective and we challenge this view
both from a theoretical and empirical perspective, showing under which con-
ditions incumbent leaders do invest more than the other ﬁrms and providing
empirical evidence in support of our thesis.
There are few competing explanations for innovation by incumbents in
Schumpeterian growth models. The simplest one, due to Segerstrom (2007)
relies on the fact that incumbents may have a technological advantage in the
R&D activity. This assumption may be realistic in certain sectors and allows
one to study monopoly persistence, but it is basically equivalent to assume
the solution of the Arrow paradox rather than solving it. Moreover, taking
this view literally, we should conclude that whenever we observe monopoly
persistence it is because the incumbent ﬁrm is more eﬃcient than the other
ﬁrms both at producing and innovating. There are many sectors in which
incumbents do not appear to have any cost advantage in the development
of innovations compared to the outsiders, and still both the incumbents and
the entrants keep investing.
Acemoglu (2008; 2009, Ch. 14) has proposed a diﬀerent rationale for
innovation by leaders. This may be due to the fact that only the incumbents
can invest in incremental innovations (because outsiders would infringe their
patents through small improvements), while entrants can invest in more radi-
2cal innovations (because of the Arrow eﬀect). In such a way, both the incum-
bents and the outsiders invest, and the growth rate depends on their rates
of investment weighted by the respective productivity increases. This is a
plausible mechanism, but it explains why incumbents may invest in small im-
provements of their own technologies, which is a trivial activity, and not why
they may directly compete against outsiders to obtain radical innovations,
which is the key issue.
Here, we propose an alternative explanation for innovation by incumbents
which does not rely on technological advantages or exogenous market struc-
tures, but is based on a pure strategic advantage of the incumbents in patent
races with endogenous entry of outsiders. We develop a simple contest for
a drastic innovation with strategic interactions in the tradition of the recent
works on endogenous market structures and market leadership,2 and show
the crucial role of entry pressure on the diﬀerent behavior of leaders and
followers. Entry reduces proﬁtability and therefore it reduces also the invest-
ment of each ﬁrm (although the aggregate investment increases). Therefore
the endogenous entry threat tends to reduce R&D intensity of each ﬁrm.
Moreover, in such a context, an incumbent would not invest at all because
of the Arrow eﬀect. However, things change under the assumption that the
incumbent is also the leader in the contest for the innovation, as reasonable
given its strategic advantage in the market. The incumbent that is also leader
exploits its ﬁrst mover advantage to invest more than the other ﬁrms. The
intuition has to do with the impact of its investment on entry: a small invest-
ment attracts large entry and makes it likely that another ﬁrm will replace
the incumbent, while a commitment to a large investment has the double
advantage of reducing entry and increasing the chances of an innovation.3
2See Etro (2007) for a review of this literature.
3Aghion and Howitt (2009: ch. 14) have forcefully advanced an “escape competition”
rationale for investment by incumbents under entry, but their models rely on the assump-
tion that a single incumbent faces an exogenous probability of entry (or an endogenous
probability that a single rival may replace its leadership). Under endogenous entry of
3We also show that these theoretical results are robust to diﬀerent model
speciﬁcations, in particular they hold in general patent races (see Etro, 2004,
2008), and in models of preliminary investment in cost reducing R&D as a
strategic commitment for the competition in the market (see Etro, 2006).
We bring to the data the two basic predictions of our theoretical investiga-
tions: R&D intensity of the average ﬁrm is lower when there is an endogenous
entry threat, and the R&D intensity of the incumbent leader is larger than
the one of the average ﬁrm when there is an endogenous entry threat.4 We
test these hypothesis through a Tobit model for R&D intensity. Our empiri-
cal investigation is based on a unique dataset on the German manufacturing
sector, the Mannheim Innovation Survey from 2005 conducted by the Centre
for European Economic Research (ZEW), that includes a wide number of
ﬁrm level data with a special focus on innovation.
A novel aspect of our empirical approach is given by the fact that the same
ﬁrms provide a subjective view on our key determinants of R&D intensity,
the entry pressure and the leadership. Rather than determining arbitrarily
the size and composition of a market, assigning a degree of entry intensity
in a discretionary way, and assigning a status of leadership on the basis of
possibly arbitrary assumptions, using the survey results we allow the ﬁrms to
identify the size of their main market, the existence of an endogenous threat
of entry in the market and the identity of the leader in the market. We also
perform robustness tests concerning the potential reverse causality between
R&D and entry threats using IV regressions and a number of exogeneity tests.
Our main predictions are strongly supported by the empirical evidence: entry
pressure reduces the average investment per ﬁrm, but incumbent leaders
invest more than other ﬁrms when there is the pressure of a strong threat of
outsiders, their incumbent would not invest as usual as a consequence of the Arrow eﬀect
(and the escape competition eﬀect would disappear as well).
4Aghion et al. (2009) provide additional empirical evidence on the impact of entry on
incumbents’ investments. For an alternative empirical investigation of the same result see
Adams and Clemmons (2008).
4entry.
These results can be interpreted as a preliminary attempt to test the main
predictions of the endogenous market structures approach, that analyzes the
role of ﬁrms in markets where entry is endogenous. In this case, the behavior
of incumbent leaders is radically diﬀerent depending on the entry conditions,
and the conclusions of the cited approach appear to be conﬁrmed empirically.
At a policy level, the results suggest also that we may have to change our
way of looking at persistent dominance in technologically advanced markets:
this may be the result of strong competitive pressures rather than of market
power.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical
model and derives the empirical prediction, Section 3 provides the empirical
evidence, and Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of R&D Investment
The aim of this section is to provide theoretical motivation for our testable
predictions. With this purpose in mind, we ﬁrst develop the simplest model
that leads to our main results, and then we sketch other theoretical frame-
works that support the same predictions.
Let us consider a simple contest between N ﬁrms to obtain a drastic inno-
vation which provides a ﬂow of proﬁts V ∈ (0,1) for the winner and generates
no gains for the losers. Each contestant i bears ﬁxed costs F ∈ (0,V/2) and
invests variable resources that lead to the probability of innovation zi ∈ [0,1].
For simplicity we assume that the cost of the R&D activity is quadratic in zi,
that is dz2
i/2, where the constant d>F/ 2 parameterizes the marginal cost of
investing in R&D. We can think of the ﬁxed cost as the investment necessary
to be engaged in R&D activity (i.e.: a laboratory), and of the variable cost
as the rate of investment in R&D spending.
If multiple ﬁrms innovate at the same time, competition in the market
5drives their proﬁts to zero, therefore only in case of a single innovator, the












where the ﬁrst term is the expected gain from innovating and the second term
is the cost of the R&D investment. The probability of winning the contest
for ﬁrm i is the probability of innovating zi multiplied by the probability that
no other ﬁrm (including the incumbent) innovates,
 
j =i (1 − zj). With this
probability, the contestant obtains the award V .
2.1 Entry and R&D investment
In this section we evaluate the impact of entry on the investment level of
each ﬁrm diﬀerent from the incumbent in Nash equilibrium. Let us take as
given the investment of the incumbent zI. If this is small enough, other ﬁrms
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to participate to the contest. Their ﬁrst order conditions
can be written as follows in a symmetric equilibrium:
z =
(1 − z)N−2(1 − zI)V
d
(2)
Even if this is an implicit expression for the equilibrium investment, its total
diﬀerentiation shows that R&D investment per ﬁrm is a decreasing function
of the number of ﬁrms (∂z/∂N < 0). Of course, total investment is increasing
in entry, but the individual impact of an increase of the number of ﬁrms
is always negative. Moreover, the investment of each ﬁrm is increasing in
the value of the innovation V and decreasing in the marginal cost of the
investment (in d), while it is independent from the ﬁxed cost F.
Since entry reduces the expected gross proﬁts and at some point these be-
come smaller than the ﬁxed cost, we can characterize the endogenous market
structure emerging when the number of potential entrants is high enough.
6Firms enter until the following zero proﬁt condition holds:
z(1 − z)






=0 ( 3 )
Substituting (2) and solving for z, this implies that, in the endogenous market






which is smaller than one under our assumptions and independent from the
investment of the incumbent. If we substitute this equilibrium investment in
(2), take the logarithms and solve for N, we obtain the endogenous number














Clearly this number is at least two if zI is small enough. More precisely,
since N(zI) = 2 requires log[(1 − zI)V/dz] = 0, entry occurs if zI < 1 −
√
2dF/V . For such a small investment of the incumbent, our conclusions
on the impact of entry on R&D spending per ﬁrm are unambiguous: this
is reduced with entry and it is deﬁnitely lower when entry is endogenous
compared to the case of an exogenous number of ﬁrms that does not exhaust
the proﬁt opportunities in the industry. Summing up, these results can be
translated as follows: the investment of the average ﬁrm is lower when the
entry threat is endogenous.5
5Notice that the equilibrium investment with endogenous entry does not depend any-
more on the value of the innovation (which increases the number of individual investors),
but it is now increasing in the ﬁxed costs of entry, and remains decreasing in the param-
eter that measures the marginal cost of investment. We can think of the marginal cost
of investment as an inverse function of the human resources of the ﬁrm: a larger pool of
workers reduces the marginal cost of research and therefore it corresponds to a lower d.
Accordingly, we could obtain the collateral prediction that the equilibrium investment is
increasing in the size of the labor force (∂z/∂d < 0) and it is increasing in a less than
proportional way (∂2z/∂d2 > 0).
7We now turn to the behavior of the incumbent ﬁrm. This ﬁrm obtains
positive proﬁts (from the existing leading technology) π>0 while the in-
vestment contest takes place, and retains the same proﬁts in case no one
innovates. Therefore, the expected proﬁts of the incumbent are:
E(PI)=π + zI
 N
j=1 [1 − zj]V +( 1− zI)
 N





in case of positive investment in the contest - otherwise expected proﬁts are
given only by the current proﬁts plus the expected value of the current proﬁts
when no one innovates. Notice that the incentives of the incumbent to invest
are lower than for the outsiders because of the Arrow eﬀect. If the incumbent
chooses how much to invest at the same time as the outsiders, endogenous
entry would lead the leader not to invest at all. In such a case, zI =0a n d
the investment of the other ﬁrms is determined as above.6
However, when the incumbent has a ﬁrst mover advantage and can choose
its investment before the entry of the outsiders, the incentives to invest are
radically changed. We examine this case in the next section.
2.2 Innovation by incumbent leaders
We now examine the contest in which the incumbent ﬁrm has a leadership
in the investment choice and can commit to its strategy zI before the other
ﬁrms. First of all, notice that in the presence of a ﬁxed number of outsiders
N, there would be two eﬀects on the investment of the incumbent leader.
On one side, the Arrow eﬀect would lead to a lower investment compared
to the followers because the incumbent leader would have less to gain from
innovating. On the other side, we would have a Stackelberg eﬀect, which
in this framework characterized by strategic substitutability works in the
6The equilibrium ﬁrst order condition for the incumbent would be zI =( 1 −zI)N−1(V −
π)/d,w h i c hs e t szI <z . However, this leads to lower proﬁts from the contest than what
expected by the outsiders. Under endogenous entry, the expected proﬁts of the outsiders
are zero, therefore the incumbent is better oﬀ withdrawing from the contest.
8opposite direction. Nevertheless, as long as π is high enough, the ﬁrst eﬀect
would prevail and the incumbent leader would invest less than the average
follower.7
However, here we are mainly interested in the case of endogenous entry
of ﬁrms, therefore we need to evaluate the investment of the incumbent in
the Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous entry.
As noticed in the previous section, as long as the investment of the leader
zI is small enough to allow entry of some followers, each one of the followers
invests as in (4) and the number of ﬁrms is given by (5). The incumbent
leader chooses zI ∈ (0,1 −
√
2dF/V ) to maximize the expected proﬁts:
E(PI)=π + zI (1 − z)






given the above equilibrium expressions for z and N. In particular, solving
(2) for (1−z)N−1V = dz(1−z)/(1−zI), using z =
 
2F/V, and substituting























⎦ − F (7)











= zI − z
2
I (8)
and the second order condition is satisﬁed only for zI < 1/2. For F/d small
enough, the smallest root of this cubic equation provides the equilibrium
investment of the incumbent leader. This must necessarily be larger than z (if
the last term on the right hand side of (8) was absent we would immediately
7For instance, with d = 1 and N =2w eh a v e :
zI =
Vπ+( 1− V )(V − π)
1 − 2V (V − π)
z =
Vπ+( 1− V )V − V 3
1 − 2V (V − π)
and the Arrow eﬀect prevails on the Stackelberg eﬀect whenever π>V3/(1 − V ).
9have zI = z, but this term reduces the marginal cost of investment). However,
when F/d is large enough and or V is small enough, the expected proﬁts are
always increasing in the investment of the leader in the relevant range, and
we have a corner solution such that no outsiders enter. The entry-deterring






which is again larger than zI under our assumptions.
When the monopolist is the leader in the competition for the innovation,
the Arrow eﬀect disappears, because the choice of the monopolist is indepen-
dent from the current proﬁts.8 Notice that the investment of the leader is
increasing in the expected ﬂow of proﬁts V (more expected proﬁts require a
larger investment to deter entry of the outsiders). Moreover, the investment
is still decreasing in d, and is now decreasing in the ﬁxed cost of entry of the
other ﬁrms (which reduces the investment needed to deter entry).
The interest of this extreme result emerges when we compare it to the
case in which the incumbent has not a ﬁrst mover advantage. In such a
case, the standard Arrow eﬀect leads to the opposite result: the incumbent
does not invest at all and only the outsiders invest and possibly innovate.
Summing up, there are two suﬃcient conditions under which monopolists
have incentives to invest in R&D and to invest more than other ﬁrms: 1)
leadership for the incumbent leader and 2) endogenous entry for the outsiders
in the race to innovate. This result shows a clear contrast with what we
expect for the average ﬁrms, and provides an empirical discriminant between
the investment of the incumbent leaders and that of the average ﬁrms: the
former should be larger than the latter if and only if there is a constant threat
of entry in the market.
The main empirical prediction of our simple model are not model speciﬁc,
and they can be found in much more general models of patent races and of
8See De Bondt and Vandekerckhove (2008) for further extensions of this result to the
case of R&D spillovers between ﬁrms.
10preliminary investment in R&D as a strategic commitment for the competi-
tion in the market. To convince the reader of this, we will brieﬂy provide a
couple of examples.
2.3 Extension I: a general patent race
A wide literature on R&D investments (started by Dasgupta and Stiglitz,
1980, and in particular elaborated by Reinganum, 1985) has studied patent
races where the investment zi generates innovations according to a Poisson
process with an arrival rate given by a function h(zi) eventually exhibiting
decreasing returns to scale, so that the expected value of innovating for an
average ﬁrm is h(zi)V/[r +
 
h(zj)] where r is the interest rate. In such a
case, one can verify that entry always reduces the investment of the average
ﬁrm, and Etro (2004, 2008) has shown that when entry is endogenous the
incumbent leader invests always more than any other single ﬁrm. In case
of linear variable costs of investment dzi, the ﬁrs order conditions for R&D
investment of the average ﬁrm z and of the incumbent leader zI and the
endogenous entry condition lead to the following equilibrium equations:
h
 (z)







These conditions show that zI >zand that the investment of every ﬁrm
is increasing in any factor that reduces the marginal cost of investment d
(typically the size of employment). Such an outcome conﬁrms the validity of
the main empirical predictions of our basic model.
2.4 Extension II: strategic investment in R&D
Similar results have been developed in models of R&D spending as a strategic
investment preliminary to the competition in the market. In these models,
R&D spending per ﬁrm is typically decreasing with the number of ﬁrms
11because more competition reduces proﬁts and sales, which reduces the in-
centives to invest: this conﬁrms our earlier results on the negative relation
between entry and investment. Moreover, the investment of the incumbent
leaders can be radically diﬀerent according to whether entry is endogenous or
not. In models of competition in prices, Etro (2006) has shown that market
leaders should spend less than the other ﬁrms in R&D investments in cost
reductions when the number of ﬁrms is exogenous, but they should spend
more when entry is endogenous.9 More generally, as shown also by Maci and
Zigic (2008) and Kov´ aˇ c, Vinogradov and ˇ Zigi´ c (2010), the leadership gener-
ates always strategic overinvestment in R&D relative to sales when entry is
endogenous.
2.5 Testable predictions
Our overview of simple and general theoretical models of the incentives to
invest in R&D emphasizes two conclusions that appear robust to alternative
modeling speciﬁcations. They can be summarized as follows:
9One should keep in mind that this result holds under competition in prices, while
under competition in quantities the leader would generally spend more than the followers
on cost reductions under both entry conditions: nevertheless, also in such a case, entry
would increase the investment of the leader. To verify the last result, let us brieﬂy consider
a model of Cournot competition with inverse demand p = a − X b e t w e e na ni n c u m b e n t
leader with marginal cost c(zI)=c−
 
zI/d,w i t hd>1, aﬀected by its investment zI and
N other ﬁrms with a constant marginal cost c. The Cournot equilibrium and the optimal
(interior) investment of the incumbent leader can be easily derived in case of an exogenous





F with the strategic investment of the leader: zI = dk
(d−1)2which implies the






(d − 1)(c +
√
F)
This result is expressed in terms of a commonly used ratio in empirical work on innovation,
and it supports again the comparative statics of our simple model.
12Hp. 1: R&D intensity of the average ﬁrm is lower when there
is an endogenous entry threat compared to when there is not.
Hp. 2: R&D intensity of the incumbent leader is larger than
the investment of the average ﬁrm when there is an endogenous
entry threat.
The ﬁrst hypothesis suggests a negative relation between the threat of
entry perceived by the ﬁrms and their rate of investment in R&D, and it
derives from the strengthening of competition for the market induced by
entry. The second one is our main interest because it is in radical contrast
with the Arrowian view of the incumbent leaders as ﬁrms investing less than
the other ﬁrms in R&D. According to our models, these leaders should invest
more than the other ﬁrms only if they face a strong threat of entry pressure.
3 Empirical Test
In this section, we perform an empirical test on whether actual ﬁrm–level
investment data support our hypotheses derived from the theoretical frame-
work.
3.1 Data sources
We use data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) from the year
2005. This innovation survey has been conducted by the Centre for Euro-
pean Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim. The ZEW conducts the survey
since 1992 and it represents the German part of the EU–wide, harmonized
Community Innovation Survey (CIS). It follows the Eurostat/OECD guide-
lines for collecting innovation data which are documented in the so–called
Oslo Manual (see Eurostat and OECD, 1997). Readers not familiar with
the survey are referred to the summary reports, e.g. Eurostat (2004, 2008).
13The MIP data constitute a representative sample of the German manufac-
turing sector as well as business related services. For our study, we focus on
the manufacturing sector. The 2005 spell of the MIP included some unique
questions allowing to model entry threats and to identify leaders.
The database has a cross-sectional structure, but the questionnaire col-
lects information generally for the years 2002 to 2004. The quantitative
variables, such as R&D investment, capital, employment, sales etc., are sur-
veyed for a certain year. For instance, R&D investment is only collected
for the year 2004. Other information that we use as controls are, however,
collected for the two years 2003 and 2004, so that we can make use of lagged
controls to avoid direct simultaneity bias in the regressions. Qualitative in-
formation, such as the competitive situation in a ﬁrm’s main market, the
ﬁrm’s competitive position etc., are collected through one question each re-
ferring to the time period 2002–2004. We will use the qualitative information
to construct variables on incumbency and entry threats during this period,
and argue that the situation between 2002 and 2004 will have an impact on
strategic investment behavior in 2004.
The dependent variable of our analysis is the R&D intensity in the year
2004 at the ﬁrm level. The intensity is deﬁned as R&D divided by sales
(RDINTi = R&Di/SALESi × 100).
The most important right-hand side variables are the entry threat and
the leadership position. An innovative aspect of our empirical approach is
given by the fact that the same ﬁrms provide a subjective view on these two
factors: rather than assigning a degree of entry intensity in a discretionary
way or assigning a status of leadership on the basis of arbitrary variables, we
allow the ﬁrms to identify the existence of an endogenous threat of entry in
the market and the identity of the leader in the market.
The survey asked for several characteristics about the competitive sit-
uation in ﬁrms’ main product markets in the time period 2002–2004. In
particular, ﬁrms were asked to indicate if a list of six statements about the
ﬁrms competitive environment apply to their situation or not. The response
14was based on a 4–point Likert scale, from “applies strongly” to “does not
apply at all”. One of those six question considered entry pressure, and was
phrased as follows: “Position in the market is highly threatened by entry
of new competitors”. Thus, our variable of entry threat, ENTRYi,i sa n
ordinal variable taking values from 0 to 3, where 3 indicates that the respon-
dent ﬁrm strongly agreed to the statement that its market position is highly
threatened by entry. When this is the case, we conjecture that entry in the
industry where the ﬁrm is active can be regarded as endogenous; when the
ﬁrm does not consider the threat of entry as present in its industry, this is
regarded as one with an exogenous number of ﬁrms. As found in the the-
oretical framework (Hp. 1), we expect a negative sign of ENTRYi in the
regressions for the average R&D intensity.
The theoretical deﬁnition of a market leader is associated with a strate-
gic ﬁrst mover advantage, but a more general deﬁnition can be based on
the leading strategic position of the ﬁrm compared to its main competitors.
Therefore, our incumbent variable is deﬁned through a question on a ﬁrms’
position compared to its main competitors. The respondents indicated if
their competitors in their main market are larger, smaller, similar size, or
larger and smaller than their ﬁrm. An incumbent leader in our analysis
is identiﬁed by an indicator variable, LEADERi, describing a ﬁrm that is
larger than the competitors in its main product market. The main advantage
of this survey information is that the ﬁrms themselves identify their relevant
market. Therefore it is irrelevant whether the company is only domestically
or also internationally active. The companies’ managers have to assess their
main competitors whoever they are and wherever they come from. This
would not be possible if, for instance, a concentration index or market share
data were used, as such information is typically only available at national
levels.
While we expect that entry has a negative impact on investment in gen-
eral, the theoretical framework shows that leaders choose to invest more than
other contestants if their market is threatened by entry (Hp. 2). We capture
15this by an interaction term of leadership and entry (LEADERi×ENTRYi).
As outlined in the theoretical model, it is desirable to control for em-
ployment and capital requirement. We include ﬁrms’ employment in t − 1
(EMPi,t−1) as well as capital intensity (KAPINTi,t−1) in the empirical model
to account for such impacts on investment decision. For the size of the
employment we expect a positive and concave relation on the basis of our
theoretical work. Concerning the role of capital intensity, we noticed that
theoretical results are model–speciﬁc. Thus, we do not have strong priors
on the sign of the coeﬃcient of capital intensity. We also control for the
Herﬁndahl index of concentration of the industry where the ﬁrm is active
(HHIi,t−1). This data is obtained from the German Monopolies Commis-
sion that biannually publishes the oﬃcial German industry concentration
statistics.
Finally, we used twelve industry dummies to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity in investment across industries. The industries are: Food, Tex-
tiles, Paper/Publishing, Chemicals, Rubber, Glass/Ceramics, Metal, Ma-
chinery, Electronics, Information & Communication Technology, Instruments/
Optics and Vehicles.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of core variables used in the up-
coming regression analysis. In total, we our sample consists of 1,857 ﬁrm–
level observations. The average R&D intensity of ﬁrms is about 2.3% and
average ﬁrms size amounts to 307 employees in the sample. 8% of all ﬁrms
are classiﬁed as incumbents.
Patent stocks, IPRs, and unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity
A main determinant of the investment in R&D is the degree of protection of
the intellectual property rights (IPRs) associated with the innovations that
each ﬁrm can obtain. It is diﬃcult to measure the degree of protection of
the IPRs at the ﬁrm level, but we can proxy this with a measure of the stock
of patents at the ﬁrm level. In particular, the diﬀerences between ﬁrms in
16the size of the patent portfolio can be associated with the diﬀerences in the
degree of expected protection of the innovations of the ﬁrms, therefore we
expect a positive correlation between R&D intensity and the patent stock.
Moreover, the introduction of this important control variable allows us to
obtain a robustness check that might account for unobserved heterogeneity
even in the absence of panel data.
Our measure of the patent stock at the ﬁrm level accounts for all patent
applications from 1978 onwards. In particular, we compute the patent stock
using the perpetual inventory method for each ﬁrm. The survey data has
been merged with the database from the German Patent Oﬃce which cov-
ers all patents ﬁled at both the German and the European Patent Oﬃce
since 1978. We follow the common practice in the literature and impose a
rate of obsolescence of 15% per year when computing the patent stock (see
e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). Including such a rate of obsolescence im-
plies, quite realistically that knowledge loses its relevance similarly as capital
depreciates over time. The variable PSTOCK is given by:
PSTOCK it =( 1− δ)PSTOCK i,t−1 + PA it,
where δ =0 .15, and PA it denotes patent applications of ﬁrm i in year t.W e
set the initial patent stock in year 1978 to zero for all ﬁrms. Since we use
data from 2002-2004 in our regressions, the bias arising from a zero starting
value will have disappeared due to the included depreciation rate δ.
Potential reverse causality between R&D and entry threat
In our empirical investigation we proxy the threat of entry in the market
where each ﬁrm is active with the perception of the ﬁrm as collected in our
survey data. This shortcut avoids the need of investigating what are the
determinants of the fact that a market is characterized or not by endogenous
entry as opposed to being limited to an exogenous number of ﬁrms. A possi-
ble concern of our approach relies in the independence of our entry variable
17from the dependent variable, R&D intensity. Reverse causality could aﬀect
our results: in principle, it is possible that current R&D leading to a future
technological advantage makes ﬁrms perceive the entry threat as less severe,
while, on the other side, if ﬁrms are not research active and neglect the devel-
opment of new processes and products, entry may appear as a quite realistic
threat. To test the possibility of a reverse relationship we experimented with
a number of candidates for instrumental variables as outlined in the following
paragraphs.
To ﬁnd instrumental variables that explain our entry variable but not
the R&D intensity variable, we need to look at the key element determining
entry pressure, the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁts in the market and
the ﬁxed costs of entry. There is a well developed theoretical and empirical
literature on the so-called barriers to entry. The empirical studies on entry
barriers address the question of natural barriers, like sunk costs of entry
determining scale economies or the importance of advertising in determining
demand, and on the other side strategic barriers, for instance excess capacity,
limit pricing, product diﬀerentiation and also innovative activity.
It is not simple to ﬁnd a measure of the ﬁxed costs of entry. Sutton (1998)
uses the size of the median plant in an industry as a proxy for minimum
eﬃcient scale, and therefore for the size of the costs of entry. In other studies
variants of size measures are used, but most studies rely on observed size as it
is very diﬃcult to get information on the minimum eﬃcient size required by
the technology used.10 We have information on total industry sales and the
number of ﬁrms active in an industry. This information is taken from oﬃcial
statistics and measured at a detailed industry level (NACE 3-digit level).11
The ratio, industry sales per ﬁrm, is applied as a proxy for minimum eﬃcient
scale and enters the regressions as a lagged value (MESt−1).
10Lyons et al. (2001) use engineering estimates based on the ﬁrms’ technologies employed
in the production process.
11NACE is the European standard industry classiﬁcation, and the ﬁrms in our sample
are active in 96 diﬀerent NACE 3–digit industries.
18Another factor that can aﬀect proﬁtability and entry is the importance
of advertising in determining demand. For our purpose, it is not relevant
whether advertising is informative or has a direct impact on preferences. In
a sector in which advertising is an important competitive factor entry could
be easier because ﬁrms can gain market shares just by advertising their prod-
ucts. On the other side, when advertising investment in the industry is large,
entry may be quite costly. In one way or the other, when advertising is per-
ceives as important by the ﬁrms, it is likely to aﬀect entry. Our survey
collects information on the importance of advertising. Firms were asked
to rank the importance of several characteristics of their competitive envi-
ronment (product quality, technological advance, service, product variety,
advertising and price) where they are active. Consequently, we employ the
variable ADV ERT which takes values between 1 and 6, where the largest
value corresponds to the highest importance of advertising in the industry
where the ﬁrm is active (and is not a measure of investment in advertising
of the single ﬁrm).
Finally, the degree of substitutability between goods can heavily aﬀect
entry pressure, as Sutton (1998, 2007) has emphasized. If products are ho-
mogenous (in the Sutton terminology a high α-industry), an entrant oﬀering
a product with a higher quality, captures a relatively large market share as
many consumers are interested in a superior product. In contrast, if products
are distant substitutes (low α-industry) a ﬁrm investing in improved product
quality will only gain a small share of the industry sales as consumer prefer-
ences are very heterogenous. Hence, product substitutability is a determinant
of entry barriers, with higher substitutability supporting entry.12 The 2005
MIP questionnaire also collected information on the relation between prod-
ucts. The respective question is “Please indicate to what extent the following
12Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) analyze a game where ﬁrms choose whether to enter
or not at the ﬁrst stage of the game, choose quality at the second stage and prices at the
third stage. Surprisingly they show in their model that only a few and in the limit only
one ﬁrm will operate in the industry despite of endogenous entry.
19characteristics describe the competitive environment in your main market.”
One characteristic is “Products of rivals are easily substitutable with ours.”
The evaluations are rated by use of a four point Likert scale ranging from
“applies entirely”(3) to “does not apply at all”(0).
Many empirical studies have also emphasized the role of net proﬁtability
for entry and market growth.13 One would expect that entry occurs more
frequently in markets where proﬁtability is expected to be high, and less
frequently when proﬁtability is expected to be low. We experimented with
a proxy for the opposite of proﬁtability, namely the percentage of defaults
out of the total number of ﬁrms in an industry as a variable standing for risk
in an industry, or industry turmoil. This turned out to have no correlation
with the threat of entry, though. Consequently we omit this variable in the
following.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1,857 observations)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
RDINTit 2.271 5.112 0 38.914
EMPi,t−1/1000 0.307 1.356 0.001 36.761
KAPINTi,t−1 0.078 0.090 0.001 0.861
LEADERit 0.080 0.271 0 1
ENTRYit 1.531 0.851 0 3
HHIi,t−1 36.778 61.022 3.15 650.17
PSTOCK i,t−1/(EMPi,t−1/1000) 8.864 26.906 0 222.447
IV candidates
MESt−1 0.079 0.166 0.009 2.102
ADV ERTit 2.219 1.428 1 6
SUBSTITUTE it 1.874 0.840 0 3
13A recent example is Berger et al. (2004).
203.2 Econometric Analysis
As not all ﬁrms invest in R&D, we estimate Tobit models that take account
for the left censoring of the dependent variable. The Tobit model to be esti-





iβ + εi (11)
where RDINT∗
i is the unobserved latent variable. The observed dependent






i if X 
iβ + εi > 0
0 otherwise
(12)
Xi represents the matrix of regressors, β t h ep a r a m e t e r st ob ee s t i m a t e d ,a n d
εi the random error term. In our basic speciﬁcation, Xi includes EMPi,t−1,
EMP2
i,t−1, KAPINTi,t−1, LEADERit, ENTRYit as well as 12 industry dum-
mies. In further models, we add the interaction term LEADERit×ENTRYit,
and PSTOCK it to control for further heterogeneity.
We ﬁrst consider homoscedastic regressions, and subsequently test for
heteroscedasticity as coeﬃcient estimates may be inconsistent if the assump-
tions of homoscedasticity is violated in Tobit models. In order to esti-
mate heteroscedastic Tobits, the homoscedastic variance σ is replaced with
σi = σ exp(Z 
iα) in the likelihood function (see Greene, 2003, pp. 768–9).
We consider groupwise multiplicative heteroscedasticity by using a set of
ﬁve size dummies (based on employment) and the industry dummies in the
heteroscedasticity term.
Table 2 shows the regression results for homoscedastic models, and Table
3 for the heteroscedastic models.
In the homoscedastic Tobit Model I, we ﬁnd that R&D investment de-
creases as the threat of entry increases. The leaders’ investment does not
21diﬀer from that of the outsiders. When we add the interaction term of lead-
ership and entry threat (see Model II), however, interesting diﬀerences occur.
While the leader dummy is still insigniﬁcant, we now ﬁnd that leaders who
are faced by potential entry invest more than the outsiders.
The results remain robust when we control for prior R&D using the patent
stock. The patent stock is highly signiﬁcant and positive, conﬁrming that
ﬁrms receiving stronger protection of IPRs through patents tend to invest
more - alternatively, ﬁrms that (successfully) conducted R&D in the past
will also invest more in the current period. One could also read this result
as contradicting the view for which ﬁrms with a lot of patents would be less
innovative and use their patent portfolio to jeopardize further investments in
R&D.
With respect to the other covariates, we ﬁnd a positive and concave rela-
tion with employment, 14 while capital intensity is positively signiﬁcant in all
models, and the Herﬁndahl index is always insigniﬁcant. Furthermore there
are diﬀerences in R&D investment across industries. The industry dummies
are always jointly diﬀerent from zero in the regressions, and our results em-
phasize a high correlation of R&D spending with ﬁrms of the Information &
Communication Technology industry.
As Table 3 shows, the assumption of homoscedasticity is rejected for all
models (see Wald tests on heteroscedasticity). The industry and ﬁrm size
dummies are always jointly signiﬁcant in the variance equation. However, our
main results are robust to the model modiﬁcation. Leaders, in general, are
still not diﬀerently investing in R&D than the outsiders, and R&D investment
is negatively aﬀected by the entry variable. Leaders that suﬀer from entry
threat also invest more than outsiders in the heteroscedastic version.
There are no dramatic changes in the estimates of the other covariates.
The patent stock is still highly positively signiﬁcant, and the estimated em-
14The inverted U curve peaks at about 20 thsd. employees. As we have only a single
observation that has more employees, we can basically conclude that R&D investment is
increasing and concave in ﬁrm size.
22ployment eﬀect remains stable. However, the positive relationship between
R&D and capital investment becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, once we cor-
rect for heteroscedasticity.
To sum up, our ﬁndings on entry are in line with our Hp. 1, that is,
investment decreases with the strength of entry threats. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd that incumbent leaders do not diﬀer in their investment from other
ﬁrms (LEADER is insigniﬁcant), unless they are threatened by endogenous
entry. Then the negative investment eﬀect is oﬀset (see the positive sign of
the interaction term LEADERi×ENTRYi). Thus, incumbents invest more
than the outsiders under endogenous entry threat. In line with our Hp. 2,
the competitive pressure of the potential entry of other ﬁrms induces the
market leaders to invest in R&D more than any other ﬁrm.
In economic terms, the ﬁndings are also highly signiﬁcant. Calculating
the expected value of RDINTi for outsiders under no entry threat, yields
(see Greene, 2003, pp. 768-9, for the computation of the expected value in
Tobit models):
E(RDINTi|LEADERi =0 ,ENTRY i =0 , ¯ Xi)=0 .98,
where the covariates are taken at the average ¯ Xi.15 In contrast, the invest-
ment intensity of outsiders under high entry threat only amounts to:
E(RDINTi|LEADERi =0 ,ENTRY i =3 , ¯ Xi)=0 .49,
which means R&D intensity reduces by about 51%, all else constant. If a
leader suﬀers from high entry threat, however, we get:
E(RDINTi|LEADERi =1 ,ENTRY i =3 , ¯ Xi)=0 .93,
which corresponds only to a 5% decrease due to entry threat. Statistically,
the leader’s reduction due to entry is not even diﬀerent from zero.
15Calculations are based on the heteroscedastic estimation of Model III.
23Results on reverse causality between R&D and entry
In this section we verify whether there is a problem of reverse causality for
which high R&D intensity of a generic ﬁrm induces low entry threat and vice
versa.
First, we test if the above mentioned instrumental variables are relevant
in the ﬁrst stage regression of entry on all covariates and the excluded in-
struments. Table 4 shows the partial F-values for the instrumental variables
in the ﬁrst stage regression.
Then we test for reverse causality in the second stage regression following
Smith and Blundlell (1986). They introduced a regression based test which
is basically equivalent to the procedure suggested by Hausman (1978, 1983)





iβ + αyi2 + ui, (13)
where the possibly endogenous regressor y2 is the entry threat in our case,
and the vector xi denotes the other regressors. Then we write the reduced
form equation for y2 as:
yi2 = z
 
iπ + vi, (14)
where z 
i contains the vector x and the other instrumental variables described
above. Once we estimate (14), we obtain ˆ vi, we can estimate our R&D






iβ + αyi2 + ρˆ vi + ei, (15)
The usual t–statistic of ˆ ρ is a valid test on the endogeneity of y2.I fi ti sn o t
rejected that ˆ ρ = 0, we do not ﬁnd that yi2 is explained y∗
i1.
Table 4 reports the IV relevance tests from the ﬁrst stage regression (par-
tial F–statistics), and the Smith-Blundell test on endogeneity of entry based
16See also Wooldridge (2002, pp. 118–120).
24on the heteroscedastic regressions of Model I (the homoscedastic version led
to the same conclusions).
Staiger and Stock (1997) emphasized that the ﬁrst–stage signiﬁcance lev-
els of the instrumental variables may be misleading, as it does not necessarily
exclude a weak instrument problem, which would lead to considerable bias
in IV regressions. Instead of interpreting the signiﬁcance level, they argue —
as rule of thumb — that the partial F–statistic should exceed the value of
10 in the case of a single endogenous regressor to conﬁdently rule out weak
instruments. As can be seen in Table 4, all F values exceed the value of 10,
and consequently we can reject a weak instrument bias.17
Furthermore, we test whether the instrumental variables are uncorrelated
with the error term in our structural equation. Only if we are conﬁdent of
having no weak instrument problem, and the instruments are not correlated
with the error term in the R&D equation, we can rely on our IV results.
The validity of the IV candidates is usually assessed using the Sargan test
or Hansen’s J–test for a heteroscedasticity–robust version. Unfortunately,
these test are based on standard 2SLS estimations, and not available for
Tobit. Therefore, we employed regular 2SLS ignoring the censoring of our
dependent variable for the test. The results are also shown in Table 4.18 The
set–up where we use MES and ADV ERT as instrumental variables pass
Hansen’s J–test, but when we include SUBSTITUTE, the test rejects the
validity of this combination of instruments.
As ﬁnal step, we test for endogeneity of ENTRY using the Smith–
Blundell test. As the results in Table 4 show, the exogeneity of ENTRY
17More recently Stock and Yogo (2005) derived new critical values for the weak instru-
ment test on basis of the rank test (see e.g. Kleibergen and Paap, 2006), and it would be
desirable to rely on these. However, the critical values are only available for a minimum of
three instrumental variables. Although our model III employs three instruments, we will
document below that these are not valid as this set–up does not pass the Hansen J–test.
Therefore we cannot utilize the Stock and Yogo test statistics.
18Note that the Hansen J–test is only applicable in case of overidentiﬁcation. Thus, we
cannot calculate the test for model I, where only one instrument is used.
25with respect to R&D investment is not rejected.
Note that we also tested more combinations of our IV candidates than
shown in Table 4, but the results never changed. We also tested other IVs
that are not mentioned in the text, e.g. the average proﬁtability in the
industry, and the ratio of capital depreciation and total assets at the industry
level as a further proxy for sunk costs. None of these were signiﬁcant in the
ﬁrst stage regression explaining entry nor did the Smith-Blundell test reject
exogeneity.
In summary, we found relevant instrumental variables, but the poten-
tial reverse causality has been rejected by the tests. Furthermore, we can
also conﬁrm the validity of instruments based on 2SLS regressions using the
Hansen J-Test for several IV combinations. Given these results, we conclude
that the results as presented in Table 3 still hold, and that our two main
hypothesis are thus conﬁrmed: R&D investment decreases with larger entry
threats in general, but leaders invest more into R&D when threatened by
entry.
In addition to feedback eﬀect from R&D to entry, some readers may
be concerned about feedback from R&D to our variable LEADER.T h e r e
we simply checked if past R&D intensity (which we have for a subsample
of about 1,000 companies) determines our leadership variable to a certain
extent. For this, we simply regressed LEADER on past R&D intensity, past
sales and industry dummies. It turn out that past sales, and thus past ﬁrm
size, dominate the relationship. There is no additional eﬀect of past R&D
beyond ﬁrm size.
The determinants of endogenous entry
The ﬁrst stage regressions for ENTRYi shown in Table 5 provide, as a side
product, an interesting analysis of the determinants of the endogeneity of
entry. They relate the perceived threat of entry to a number of control
variables. In particular, we propose three models, all of which include the
26size of the ﬁrm, its capital intensity, the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index, the
incumbent status variable and the minimum eﬃcient size (as in Model I),
with the addition of the importance of advertising (as in Model II) and also
of the perceived substitutability between products (as in Model III). In this
last case, we can emphasize a number of signiﬁcant results.
First, larger ﬁrms, both in terms of employment and of their own per-
ception of relative size, are less likely to be active in markets where entry
is endogenous, while capital intensity and the index of concentration in the
market do not appear to aﬀect the extent of entry pressure in the market.
More interesting, a large minimum eﬃcient scale is negatively correlated with
the perceived entry threat: in other words, natural entry barriers make it less
likely that entry is endogenous. The perceived importance of advertising in
the market is positively correlated with endogenous entry: this may suggest
that entry is perceived as easy when investments in advertising are crucial
to increase market shares. Also the perceived degree of substitutability be-
tween goods is associated with endogenous entry: when goods are highly
substitutable, it is easy to enter and increase market share by oﬀering the
products at low enough prices, while diﬀerentiated goods reduce the relevance
of entry pressure.
Of course, this is only a preliminary and incomplete investigation of the
determinants of the endogeneity of market structures. Further work should
uncover other explanatory variables and verify the possible links between
them.
4 Conclusions
Who does invest in R&D? This article has provided theoretical and empirical
motivations for a relatively surprising answer to this question: market leaders
do invest in R&D more than other ﬁrms when they are under the competitive
pressure of endogenous entrants. The immediate consequence is that under
27these conditions incumbents are more likely to innovate and therefore to
persist in their leading position. This result suggests that we may have
to change our way of looking at persistent dominance in a technologically
advanced market: this may be the result of strong competitive pressures.
A novel aspect of our empirical approach is given by the fact that the same
ﬁrms provide a subjective view on our key determinants of R&D intensity,
the entry pressure and the leadership. Rather than determining arbitrarily
the size and composition of a market, assigning a degree of entry intensity in
a discretionary way, and assigning a status of leadership on the basis of pre-
determined variables, using the questionnaire of the Mannheim Innovation
Panel we allow the ﬁrms to identify the size of their main market, the exis-
tence of an endogenous threat of entry in the market and the identity of the
leader in the market. Our empirical approach can be seen as a ﬁrst attempt
to test the predictions of the endogenous market structures approach and
could be applied to other empirical implications, for instance, on on the role
of leaders in pricing strategies, preliminary investments, ﬁnancial decisions
and so on.
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31Appendix
Table A1: Sample description by industry aggregates
Industry # obs. # leaders Average R&D intensity (in %)
Food 121 13 0.33
Textiles/Leather 97 9 1.21
Paper/Publish 306 23 0.73
Chemicals 132 6 3.50
Rubber 138 9 1.16
Glass/Ceramics 82 11 0.93
Metal Production 61 5 0.63
Metal Fabrication 259 22 1.09
Machinery 222 23 2.68
Electronics 109 7 2.51
ICT 70 3 5.65
Instruments/Optics 172 14 7.10
Vehicles 88 4 2.37
Total 1857 149
32Table 2: Homoscedastic Tobit models on R&D intensity (1,857 observations)
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t−1/1000 0.840∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.267) (0.260)
(EMPi,t−1/1000)2 −0.021∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.019∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
KAPINTi,t−1 4.126∗∗ 4.039∗∗ 3.621∗
(2.066) (2.065) (2.017)




LEADERit −0.099 −0.161 −0.298
(0.676) (0.676) (0.660)
ENTRYit −0.598∗∗∗ −0.853∗∗∗ −0.727∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.246) (0.240)
ENTRYit ∗ LEADERit 0.541∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗
(0.217) (0.212)
Intercept −4.788∗∗∗ −4.844∗∗∗ −4.816∗∗∗
(0.939) (0.939) (0.915)
Industry dummies χ2(12) 304.69∗∗∗ 298.33∗∗∗ 239.66∗∗∗
Log–Likelihood −3769.18 −3766.07 −3735.12
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicate a signiﬁcance level
of 1% (5%, 10%).
33Table 3: Heteroscedastic Tobit models on R&D intensity (1,857 observations)
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t−1/1000 0.625∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.111) (0.112)
(EMPi,t−1/1000)2 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
KAPINTi,t−1 1.047 1.037 1.031
(0.919) (0.927) (0.924)




LEADERit 0.147 0.135 0.045
(0.271) (0.269) (0.271)
ENTRYit −0.203∗ −0.322∗∗ −0.317∗∗
(0.120) (0.130) (0.128)
ENTRYit ∗ LEADERit 0.302∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗
(0.115) (0.114)
Intercept −0.802∗∗ −0.909∗∗∗ −0.949∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.334) (0.338)
Industry dummies: χ2(12) 143.09∗∗∗ 142.86∗∗∗ 109.11∗∗∗
Log–Likelihood −3533.40 −3529.90 −3511.60
Wald Test on
heteroscedasticity: χ2(17) 534.22∗∗∗ 530.71∗∗∗ 514.14∗∗∗
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicate a signiﬁcance level
of 1% (5%, 10%).






F-Test on IV signiﬁcance










Hansen J–testb —0 .028 7.704∗∗
Notes: *** (**,*) indicate a signiﬁcance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
a Based on heteroscedastic model I. t–statistics of ﬁrst stage residuals are displayed.
b Based on 2SLS regressions as test is not available for Tobit.
35Table 5: IV ﬁrst stage regressions on entry (1,857 observations)
Variables Model I Model II Model III
EMPi,t−1/1000 −0.057∗ −0.051 −0.065∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
(EMPi,t−1/1000)2 0.0014∗ 0.0013 0.002∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
KAPINTi,t−1 0.087 0.153 0.061
(0.241) (0.239) (0.243)
HHIi,t−1 −0.00001 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
LEADERit −0.242∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
MESi,t−1 −0.330∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −0.340∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.083) (0.014)




Intercept 1.711∗∗∗ 1.559∗∗∗ 1.269∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.097) (0.110)
F–test: industry dummies 2.44∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗ 1.88∗∗
F–test: IVs 14.33∗∗∗ 14.47∗∗∗ 21.41∗∗∗
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) indicate a signiﬁcance level
of 1% (5%, 10%). The ‘F–test: IVs’ refers to a joint signiﬁcance test of our
instrumental variables, which are MES in model I, MES and ADV ERT in
model II and MES, ADV ERT and SUBSTITUTE in model III.
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